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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The issue of free trade is presently very important, both in Canada and 
the United States. As a Canadian attending school in the U.S., I have 
taken an interest in the outcome of the free trade negotiations, and in 
particular, the controversy over Canadian lumber exports to the United 
States. Having lived in an area of Canada where the lumber industry is 
an Important part of the economy, I can understand the Canadian views 
on the lumber issue. Having also lived in Montana where the lumber 
industry plays the same Important role in the economy, I can 
understand the American views on the lumber issue as well.
Although the lumber issue is a primary concern, the overall issue 
between Canada and the United States is free trade. Free trade occurs 
when two countries agree, by binding treaty, not to use ta r if f  or 
nontariff devices to protect their respective domestic industries. At 
the present time, the governments of Canada and the United States are 
preparing for discussions on free trade between the two nations. 
Several preliminary meetings have been held and both sides hope to. 
reach an agreement by the fa ll of 1987. The reason for the time 
lim itation is that the U.S. Congress has only given President Reagan 
until the f irs t of 1988 to reach a free trade agreement w ith Canada, 
and Congress requires six weeks to decide on any agreement reached 
between the two sides. Thus the fa ll 1986 deadline.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the paper w ill examine the 
politics behind setting up a free trade agreement and the d ifficu lties  
that the Canadian and U.S. governments face in doing so. Second, the 
paper w ill examine the economic effects of a free trade agreement on 
North America’s lumber industry and the political implications on 
Canada and the United States,
In examining these two issues, the paper w ill address questions 
regarding the guarantees required by each country before each agrees 
to negotiate a free trade package, the effects of free trade on the 
lumber industry (both large and small firm s) in both countries, and the 
impact that a free trade agreement between Canada and the United 
States could have on America's other trading partners.
Definition of Terms
Countervailing Duties
A countervailing duty is a monetary penalty placed on an import 
product that has been determined to be unfairly subsidized and 
therefore Injuring sim ilar domestic products.
GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade)
The principal global arrangement for trade liberalization. Although 
generally designed as a temporary agreement, GATT evolved into a 
permanent and important institution. It became effective In 1948 
w ith 19 countries as members. Its membership has since expanded to 
include almost all of the important noncommunist nations and several 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe (Robock and Simmonds, 1983).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The primary reason for GATT's existence Is to provide a framework for 
multinational trade negotiations. GATT also has a number of prin­
ciples that help further trade expansion, One of the principles Is 
nondiscrimination. A ta r if f  that is granted must be granted to all 
GATT members under the most-favored-natlon clause of the agree­
ment. Therefore, no country can give trade preference to another 
without giving It to all members of GATT,
Another GATT principle Is the concept of consultation. When trade 
disagreements occur, GATT provides a forum for consultation. Here 
the two sides in the dispute are more likely to reach a compromise 
than to resort to arbitrary trade-restricting actions. World trade 
cooperation since World War Two has led to a more open-door trading 
policy. GATT has played a major role in this e ffo rt (Terpstra, 1972, 
1978, 1983).
Stumpage
Stumpage Is the monetary value of standing timber, or more narrowly, 
the cost to remove the timber. The residual value method of calculat­
ing stumpage arrives at prices by subtracting from the end product 
value all relevant costs of production and transportation, as well as an 
allowance for p ro fit and risk.
In Canada, private firm s are awarded 15-25 year tenure agreements 
and cutting licenses on a f irs t  come, f irs t  served basis. Firms pay the 
appraised price but are also responsible for planning, managing and 
replanting the forest and other associated costs, Including road 
building and fire  protection. As well, stumpage prices change every 
month in accordance w ith the market. The provincial governments net 
most of their gain or loss from these fluctuations.
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In the United States, the appraisal constitutes a base from which to 
launch competitive bidding for forest cutting rights, sometimes up to 
five years in advance. The management cost is added to the appraisal 
before bids are let, and the U.S. Forest Service carries out the work. 
Prices are set on the day of sale and do not change over the life  of the 
contract, usually three to five years (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 
1986).
Justification of the Paper
Free trade between Canada and the United States is not only important 
to the two nations, but to the rest of the world as well. Most 
countries follow a practice of subsidizing or protecting major 
industries which are of v ita l Importance, be it  in terms of national 
security, economy or pride. What Canada and the United States are 
discussing is eliminating subsidies and protectionism. Such an agree­
ment w ill have a profound effect on businesses In both countries 
which is the primary reason why i t  has become so d iff icu lt for the two 
sides to s it down and to come to an agreement on a free trade 
package.
Free trade between the two nations is also significant on other 
grounds. Some Canadians are fearful that their country may be 
annexed by the United States. They feel that free trade w ill open up 
the border between the two countries to such an extent that only one 
country w ill emerge. As well, other countries are taking an interest 
in the Canada-US talks. If free trade is achieved between Canada and 
the United States, such countries as Japan, Britain and West Germany 
may also seek to negotiate sim ilar trade agreements w ith the United 
States, These issues must be considered when discussing the 
Canada-US free trade issue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The US lumber Industry has stated that it  Is being hurt by Canadian 
lumber imports. It accuses the Canadian government (both Federal and 
Provincial) of subsidizing its  lumber industry. Canadian producers, on 
the other hand, assert that they are simply more effic ient than U.S. 
producers and that the high value of the U.S. dollar makes Canadian 
lumber cheaper. Obviously, the Reagan Administration believes 
Canadian lumber is being subsidized, as it  recently moved to impose a 
15 percent import duty on Canadian softwood products entering the 
United States. The possibility of Canada subsidizing its  lumber 
industry versus the possibility that the Canadian industry Is more 
efficient, needs to be examined further as no free trade agreement 
could be signed if  Canada were protecting its  lumber industry.
Research Methods
This paper is based on a content analysis of secondary sources from 
the Federal and Provincial governments of Canada and the Federal and 
State governments of the United States. In addition, editorials and 
articles on the issue of free trade and how it  w ill affect the lumber 
industry w ill be examined in this research paper.
Contributions of the Paper
This paper w ill be of benefit to individuals interested in the free trade 
talks between Canada and the United States, especially those involved 
in the lumber industry. The paper w ill also provide insight regarding 
the free trade issue using the views of government o ffic ia ls  on both 
sides of the border. As well, the views of leading c ritics  and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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proponents of the talks from both countries are presented This paper 
w ill also provide an understanding of what the two nations are hoping 
to achieve from a free trade agreement and what types of pressure are 
being placed on the governments In each country.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
CHAPTER 2
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADA-US 
LUMBER TRADE RELATIONSHIP
Background
The recent proposal to place import ta r iffs  on Canadian lumber Is not 
the f irs t time restrictions have been placed on cross-border trade of 
lumber products. Tariffs were In effect until 1913 when the U.S. 
realized the need for Canadian wood In order to Increase the pace of 
urbanization of American cities (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). 
During the depression, the United States refused to allow lumber 
Imports, but In 1935 the restrictions were removed as domestic 
lumber prices rose significantly.
In the 1960’s and early 1970*s, Presidents Johnson and Nixon appealed 
to Canada to Increase their export production to meet U.S. demand and 
to keep prices low In the U.S. housing market Figure 1 shows the 
Increase In softwood lumber production In Canada and the U.S, between 
1975 and 1985.
American leaders acknowledged that the U.S. could not be se lf- 
sufficient in lumber production during periods of stable growth and 
looked to Canada as a secure source of supply (Maly, DalSaglio, and 
McKinsey, 1986). By the 1980’s, economic conditions In the United 
States worsened and actions In favor of restricting Canadian Imports 
began.
In the late I970*s, Canada Increased its  market share of lumber 
consumption in the United States. A primary cause for the increase 
was the use of new technology In Canadian mills. The Canadian 
Industry also began harvesting smaller trees which gave them an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
FIGURE 1
INC R EA SE IN SOFTW OOD LU M B ER  PR O D U C TIO N  
BETWEEN 1 9 7 5  AND 1 9 8 5
103
U.#. CofMBdO
increased supply of lumber. Another important factor in Canada's 
increased U.S. market share was the decreased value of the Canadian 
dollar. In 1976, exchange rates reversed and the value of the U.S. 
dollar moved above parity w ith the Canadian dollar, where i t  s t i l l  
remains today even in terms of real exchange rates. Figure 2 presents 
exchange rates for 1979-1984.
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FIGURE 2
QUARTERLY IN D EX O F REAL EXCHANG E RATES 
CANADIAN DOLLAR PE R  U .S . DOLLAR  
(1977 ANNUAL AVERAGE — 100)
1970
V * a r
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How A Countervailing Suit Is Processed
At this time, it  is relevant to discuss how a countervailing suit is 
processed. Both Canada and the United States are members of GATT, 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and therefore have sim ilar 
trade laws in regard to imposing countervailing duties. In the United 
States, any concerned party (individual, group, or business firm ) may 
file  a petition requesting countervailing duties to be placed on 
subsidized imported goods. It should be noted, however, that such 
duties are illegal under the GATT agreement. The petition is then 
moved to the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) who determine 
whether there is a material injury caused by imports on domestic 
products. If no material injury is found, then the case is dropped, If, 
however, the Commission finds that the Import product is causing 
material injury, the case is turned over to the International Trade
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Administration (ITA), part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, who 
determine If foreign subsidies exist. If ITA finds that subsidies do 
exist, i t  moves to establish the amount of the countervailing duty to 
be Imposed on the foreign goods.
There are a number of ways to stop the countervailing duties from 
being imposed. The U.S. President has the power to decide not to 
impose the duties. Also, the decisions of the ITC and ITA may be 
contested in the U.S. Court of International Trade. Rarely 1s this step 
taken but a reversal of a decision could have an Immense impact on the 
future interpretation of U.S. trade law by the ITC and ITA. The Court of 
International Trade's rulings are subject to review and possible 
reversal In a Court of Appeals; otherwise the administrative agencies 
are obliged to abide by court decisions (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 
1986).
RULINGS ON CANADIAN LUMBER IMPORTS TO THE U.S.
In December 1981, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee and the U.S.
House Ways and Means Committee petitioned the U.S. ITC to conduct a 
study comparing the Canadian and American lumber Industries and the 
effect of Canadian softwood lumber Imports on the U.S. Industry. In 
April 1982, the ITC issued its  report. The report found that Canadian 
softwood lumber imports caused a material injury to U.S. lumber 
producers. In October of the same year, the United States Coalition for 
Fair Canadian Lumber Imports submitted a petition to the ITA calling 
for countervailing duties on Canadian lumber (Maly, DalSaglio, and 
McKinsey, 1986). The petition accused the Canadian governments of 
directly and indirectly subsidizing their lumber products industry. It 
stated that the subsidies enjoyed by Canadian lumber firms was 
causing U.S. competitors to be Injured. Canadian stumpage prices was 
the main Issue of the allegations made by the Coalitllon.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In November of 1982, the Canadian Softwood Lumber Committee was 
formed to represent the Canadian lumber industry at the ITA hearings. 
The f irs t  move of the Committee was to prepare a brief denouncing the 
charges and stipulating that the decline of the U.S. softwood Industry 
was caused by a combination of economic factors affecting both 
countries, and that speculative overbidding and declining value of the 
Canadian dollar were more correct causes of Increased market share 
than alleged subsidies (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
By March 1983, the ITA had returned w ith its  preliminary findings. It 
stated that the subsidies being provided to Canadian producers and 
exporters of softwood lumber were below the minimum level, 0.5 
percent of the value of the product, needed to class the subsidies as 
significant. The ITA also stated that Canadian stumpage fees should 
not be considered a subsidy, as they were not being used to assist a 
specific industry or company and were not export oriented. The U.S. 
Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports challenged the IT As 
findings In the U.S. Court of International Trade. The appeal was 
denied and the ITA's final decisions were handed down In May 1983.
In March 1985, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and his Special Trade 
Representative requested the ITC to do an updated Investigation of the 
U.S. and Canadian lumber industries. This action was undoubtedly 
triggered by members of Congress, especially those from the 
Northwest of the U.S., who continued to make allegations of unfair 
trade practices by the Canadian government. Domestic complaints 
centered around the disparity between record consumption levels in 
1984 and only marginal Improvements In employment and p ro fitab ility  
among U.S. firm s (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). Senator Bob 
Packwood, committee chairman of the special Senate session on 
Canadian lumber said, It Is time for the Canadian government to 
recognize the consequences of Its softwood lumber pricing practices. 
Canada must come to terms w ith  the severe dislocations experienced 
by the American Industry and the reaction which that has produced.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The ITC released the findings of the updated report in October 1985. It 
found that Canadian lumber firm s pay only one-tenth of what U.S. 
firm s must pay for timber. Senator Bob Packwood then requested 
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter to enter Into high-level negotiations w ith 
the Canadian government on the timber pricing problem (Senator Max 
Baucus' Office). The negotiations failed to come up w ith  a solution and 
in May 1986, the U.S. government imposed a 35 percent ta r if f  on 
Canadian cedar shingles.
The Canadian government tried to avoid a sim ilar ruling on Canadian 
softwood imports to the United States. Canadian Trade Minister Pat 
Carney offered to raise stumpage prices of Canadian Crown lumber by 
12 percent. Carney hoped this would change the minds of U.S. lumber 
producers and end the cross-border dispute over softwood lumber. 
Carney said that Canada had made a once only" offer to voluntarily 
raise the price of lumber exported to the United States. The U.S. 
producers refused the offer.
On October 16. 1986, the U.S. Commerce Department reversed their 
1983 finding that Canadian lumber pricing practices did not constitute 
a subsidy CAP, October 17, 1986). The Reagan Administration then 
moved to Impose a 15 percent duty on Canadian softwood lumber 
imports to offset what It claimed were Illegal subsidies by Canadian 
provincial governments. This was only the preliminary ruling. The 
final decision w ill be presented on December 30, 1986 and the 
Canadian government can then decide whether to appeal the decision.
The Prevalent Economic Conditions of the Canada-U.S. Lumber 
iM ü s tr lêJs. 1970 to the Present
In a sense. North America could be considered one large forest. Com­
bined, Canada and the United States have almost a billion acres of 
productive forestland. Canada has 490 m illion acres of productive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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forestland while the United States has 483 m illion acres of productive 
forestland. Figures 3 and 4 show productive forestland In Canada and 
the U.S.
FIGURE 3
O W N E R S H IP  O F  P R O D U C T IV E  F O R E S T
LA N D  IN  C A N A D A  
1976
Pwbll*
FIGURE 4
O W N E R S H IP  O F  C O M M E R C IA L  T IM B E R L A N D  
IN  T H E  U N IT E D  S TA TE S
1977
I
■S .i 136
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Canada and the United States have the second and third largest 
productive forest resources, while the U.5.5.R. has the largest 
available resources. Future estimates have shown that the big three- 
the U.S.A., Canada and the U.S.S R.-wIll produce approximately 
two-thirds of the world's supply of forest products In 1990 while at 
the same time consuming 64 percent of the world's total demand.
(Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
During the mid to late 1970's, the lumber Industries of Canada and the 
United States attained high levels of activity. Then activ ity dropped 
during the world recession of 1981-82. However, by 1986 the two 
nations lumber Industries had recovered. U.S. production levels rose 
from the 1982 low of 25.1 b illion board feet to 32.8 billion board feet, 
while Canadian production Increased nearly one-third over 1982 levels 
to 20.1 billion board feet in 1983 and 20.6 b illion board feet in 1984. 
(Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). Housing starts are also another 
Indicator of how well the lumber Industry is doing. Figure 5 shows a 
comparison of 1975 and 1984 housing starts In Canada and the U.S.
FIGURE 5
U .S . A N D  C A N A D IA N H O U S IN G  S T A R T S
107A TO 1084
LEGEND 
197tt 
H I  1004
U.S.
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The U.S. lumber industry basically exists to serve a domestic market. 
Only a very small portion of U.S. production is exported. The Canadian 
lumber industry is much different. It sells only about one-quarter of 
its  production for domestic use and exports the remainder. About 67 
percent of all Canadian lumber exports goes to the United States, as 
shown in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
MARKETS FOR U.S. AND CANADIAN 
LUMBER PRODUCTION
1M» (0 MOMTHS)
U.S. Production Conodlon Production
The ten year period between 1976 and 1985 saw the amount of U.S. 
lumber exports decrease while imports into the U.S. increased. Total 
U.S. softwood exports declined from a high of 1.9 b illion board feet in 
1960 to 1.6 billion board feet in 1984 while total imports have 
steadily risen from 22 percent of the U.S. market share in 1976 to 31 
percent of the market share in 1984. (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 
1986). By 1985, Canadian softwood imports into the United States
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reached 148 billion board feet, up almost threefold from 1975. Figure 
7 shows softwood lumber imports from Canada for 1975 and 1985,
FIGURE 7
S O F T W O O D  L U M B E R  IM P O R T S  
F R O M  C A N A D A
##
Ï
I
i:'
• •  ‘
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5.7
1970
V«or
For over 50 years Canada has been a dependable supplier of softwood 
lumber to the United States. Softwood lumber is one of the most 
Important single items of trade between Canada and the United 
States. In 1985 Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. were in excess of 
Canadian $3.5 billion. Over 60 000 Canadian jobs are directly 
dependent on those exports (Department of External Affairs, Canada, 
July 4, 1986). By placing a ta r if f  on Canadian softwood lumber 
Imports, i t  is obvious that the Canadian lumber industry w ill suffer 
economically. On the other hand, the United States may be able to save 
some of the economic downfall of its  lumber industry by imposing this 
action. Potlatch Corporation, which already had been forced to close 
three lumber m ills  in Idaho, announced the closure of a fourth in 1985.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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That m ill employed just over 200 \A/orkers (Coalition for Fair Lumber 
imports, January 20, 1986). Between 1977 and 1984, the U.S. 
government calculated that 30 000 jobs were lost in the lumber 
industry, This s ta tis tic  does not begin to show the real job loss in 
the U.S. because of Canadian imports due to the ripple effect of such 
losses in the economy.
Future of the Canada-US Lumber Industries
The Canadian forest industry is worried about reforestation. Part of 
the money received for a harvested tree must be used for reforesta­
tion. Since stumpage fees are uncommonly low in Canada, they find 
themselves unable to generate the funding to reforest harvested 
woodlands at a rate that would generate a future timber supply. A 
spokesman for the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association recently 
stated; Continuation of present levels of regeneration, stand improve­
ment, and resource protection w ill precipitate a decline from current 
levels of wood production. Consequently, members of the Canadian 
lumber industry are concerned that the lack of expenditures on 
regeneration and resource protection may have long-term implications 
on the industry's competitiveness in the export market.
In the United States, the U.S. Forest Service predicts that long-term 
demand for lumber products w ill increase during the next half century. 
Imports are expected to rise, especially from Canada, fillin g  part of 
the domestic need. The balance of domestic need w ill be filled  by U.S. 
lumber. Total projected softwood roundwood harvest rises from 9.6 
billion cubic feet in 1980 to 11.9 billion cubic feet in 2030. Projected 
annual softwood timber harvests in the West remain close to the 1980 
level of 2.3 billion cubic feet until 1990 and then decline slightly to 
about 2.0 billion cubic feet. The Southern subregions of softwood 
timber harvests are projected to increase steadily from about 4.1 
billion cubic feet in 1980 to 7.3 billion in 2030 (Maly, DalSaglio, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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McKlnsey, 1986), As well, prices are expected to change with 
variances in supply and demand.
Chgptgr ..Summary
The history of lumber trade between Canada and the United States has 
been long and sometimes rocky. In the 1960's and 70 s the American 
government was almost begging for Canada to increase its  lumber 
exports to the U.S. to help meet domestic demand. By the 1980's, the 
U.S. had had enough of Canadian lumber imports. The U.S. economy was 
sagging and Canadian imports were causing U.S. lumbermills to shut 
down and lumbermen to lose their jobs. A countervail action was 
brought against the Canadian lumber industry in 1981, but by 1983, the 
U.S. ITA had ruled against the petition. In 1985, the suit was reopened 
and the recent preliminary findings (October 1986) have reversed the 
earlier decision.
As far as competition goes, the U.S. lumber producers are not trying to 
drive their Canadian competitors out of the U.S. market, What U.S. 
lumber producers are seeking is an equal competitive position in order 
to retain a fa ir market share at prices that result in an adequate 
return on investment (Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, January 20, 
1986).
Concerns have been raised over Canadian reforestation practices. 
Canadians have been cutting younger trees and failing to reforest the 
lands. Experts predict that a continuation of this policy could cause a 
decline in future levels of wood production. This could hurt the 
Canadian lumber industry as U.S. o ffic ia ls  predict an increase in 
demand for lumber over the next 50 years and imports are expected to 
increase. If Canada's production declines due to lack of reforestation, 
they w ill be unable to capitalize on the projected increase of demand 
in the U.S. market.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NORTH AMERICAN LUMBER INDUSTRY 
IN TERMS OF THE BROADER FREE TRADE QUESTION
Background
The Canadian lumber import controversy has interupted the Canada-US 
discussions on a fu ll scale free trade agreement. On December 10, 
1985, President Ronald Reagan formally requested authority from the 
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee to 
begin negotiations. These Committees agreed to Mr. Reagan's request 
and he may negotiate w ith  Canada until the beginning of 1988.
However, some members of Congress and the Special Trade 
Representative have said that broader discussions could not begin 
until the lumber issue is cleared up (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 
1986). On the other side of the border, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
of Canada addressed the House of Commons and told them of his plans 
to proceed w ith free trade negotiations between Canada and the United 
States. Because of the different political system in Canada (the 
Parliamentary system), Mr. Mulroney was able to prepare for free trade 
talks w ith only minimal discussion and delay.
Canada and the United States are currently preparing for talks on free 
trade between the two nations, Over the past year, a number of 
studies have been completed by the respective Federal governments to 
ascertain the advisib ility of more liberal trade relations. From these 
studies, two basic recommendations have been set forth: ( l ) to 
proceed w ith negotiations to establish a comprehensive Canada-United 
States Free Trade Area; or (2) to take more liberal steps toward trade 
enhancement, such as selective ta r if f  reductions and removal of 
certain nontariff barriers to increase trade flows and improve market
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accessibility on both sides of the shared border (Maly, DalSaglio, and 
McKinsey, 1986). The two governments are s t i l l  In the process of 
discussing the trade issues.
Causes of the Delay in Free Trade Negotiations Between Canada
and the United States
Most Americans feel that Canada is unfairly subsidizing its  lumber 
industry. Representative Bonker stated that throughout the 
Administration and the Congress there is now a widespread agreement 
that the Canadian stumpage pricing system constitutes an unfair 
subsidy, and that this practice must be terminated (NFPA, May, 1986).
Since the lumber issue appeared to be the stumbling block in the 
negotiations, Canadian and U.S. trade o ffic ia ls  held a number of 
meetings to address the problem. As of yet, no consensus has been 
reached. The focal point of the dispute stems around a report issued 
by the U.S. ITC in October 1985 and a decision by the U.S. Commerce 
Department in October 1986. Basically, the report was a re-evaluation 
of an earlier report presented by the ITC in 1983. The subject of the 
report was whether or not the Canadian government was 
subsidizing its  lumber industry. The 1983 report found that Canada 
was not subsidizing its  lumber industry, but the 1985 report and the 
1986 U.S. Commerce Department decision overturned this ruling and 
imposed a 15 percent import duty on Canadian softwood imports.
The Canadian government feels that their stumpage pricing practices 
should not be an issue since in 1983 the International Trade 
Commission set down a decision that exonerated Canadian lumber 
exporters from U.S. industry charges that they were being subsidized 
(Lewington, April 10, 1986). Some Canadians believe that the new 
tough stance taken by the U.S. government w ill hurt trade talk 
relations. Opinion polls show public support has been slipping rapidly 
in Canada and the U.S. lumber duty may make it  all that much harder
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for Ottawa to continue w ith the talks, government sources said 
(Blinch, October 21, 1986). Figure 8 shows the results of the poll.
FIGURE 8 SUPPORT FOR CANADA-US TRADE TALKS
Do you support the federal government’s position on negoti­
ating a freer trade package with the government of the 
United States?
Y E S
Y E S
23%
Y E S
16%
C a y *  B v « t * n
However, a different view is held by American officials. The U.S. 
decision to slap duties on Canadian lumber has worsened ties between 
the two big trading partners, but in the end may prod them toward an 
early agreement on bilateral free trade, U.S. o ffic ia ls  say (Trautman, 
October 18, 1986).
Wheat subsidies are another controversial issue which has been 
deterring the trade talks from beginning. The U.S. Congress has 
proposed legislation that would allow U.S. subsidized wheat to be sold 
to the Soviet Union and China, two of Canadian wheat producer's best 
customers. George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State has called the 
legislation ridiculous and harmful to relations w ith grain-exporting 
allies such as Canada, although the U.S. Congress continues to pressure 
the Reagan Administration to ignore foreign protests (Shepherd, 1986).
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Since wheat is one of Canada's major export products, this move by the 
U.S. Congress has enraged a majority of Canadian wheat farmers and, 
in turn, a majority of Canadian politicians who are putting pressure on 
Prime Minister Mulroney to take retaliatory actions.
Besides the grain dispute, relations between Canada and the United 
States have been strained over President Ronald Reagan's decision to 
slap a 35 percent ta r if f  on Canadian cedar shakes and shingles and 
Canada's decision to retaliate w ith  new and increased duties on items 
such as Christmas trees, books and computer parts(ibid). Canada 
Imposed a 10 percent ta r if f  on American books and periodicals 
published less than four times per year, a 3,9 percent ta r if f  on 
computer parts and a 5,4 percent ta r if f  on certain semiconductor 
devices. As well, other ta r iffs  w ill be applied against a variety of U.S. 
imports into Canada, from oatmeal to diesel cars. The two nations 
keep saying they want a free trade arrangement w ith each other, yet 
they do everything in their power to place strains on the talks by 
issuing new ta riffs  or duties. As Canada's Prime Minister, Brian 
Mulroney recently said. If you were a betting man right now, you'd have 
to say there's going to be no deal-the Americans are going to shoot it  
down.
Another major issue delaying the trade ta lks-at least on the Canadian 
side of the border-is the issue of sovereignty. The feeling is growing 
in Canada that these talks pose a grave danger to our sovereignty. 
Canadians are worried about becoming merely a trust te rrito ry of the 
United States, said prominent nationalist Mel Hurtig, chairman of the 
Council of Canadians. Some Canadians fear that the increased trade 
caused by a free trade agreement w ill allow Americans to in filtra te  
their very way of life. They fear that their cultural history and ties 
w ith the Commonwealth w ill be destroyed. They fear annexation.
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However, Prime Minister Mulroney has pledged to protect the vague 
concept of "cultural sovereignty’ In the trade negotiations. Mulroney 
said the Canada Council, the CBC and the National Ballet are examples 
of Institutions not up for negotiation (Blinch, 1986), Until this group 
of Canadians is satisfied that Canada w ill not give up her sovereignty 
In a free trade deal, they w ill continue to pressure the Canadian 
government to stop trade negotiations w ith  the United States.
Many of the d ifficu lties  that have arisen in preparing for free trade 
talks stem from the fact that Canada and the United States have 
different political systems. The United States places an emphasis on 
the private sector taking a prominent role in the country’s economy, 
whereas In Canada the public sector (government) plays a prominent 
role In the economy.
Presently, there Is pressure In the U S. Congress to formulate more 
rather than less restrictive trade measures. At the present time, 
there are over 300 pieces of legislation before Congress that would In 
some way restric t Imports to the United States. Of these 300 bills, 
there are at least a dozen that could affect Canada-US trade. The 
primary reason for this pressure is the U.S. trade deficit. The United 
States trade defic it w ith Canada soared last year to $22.2 billion U.S., 
second only to the nearly $50 billion w ith Japan, Of the total, the 
Canadian forestry products accounted for $4 billion (AP, August 4, 
1966). By singling countries or Industries out, the U.S. Congress can 
make an easier arguement that imports are hurting U.S. workers. The 
Congress tends to focus on trade deficits w ith specific countries and 
certain Import categories because job losses and the transfer of 
ownership of domestic Industries to foreign creditors are more 
tangible problems (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). That Is why 
the Canadian lumber Industry has been singled out as causing 
unemployment In the U.S. lumber Industry.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
Trade negotiations between Canada and the United States cannot begin 
until the problems stated here have been solved. As i t  stands now, it  
seems unlikely that trade talks w ill be able to begin in time enough to 
reach an agreement by the fa ll 1987 deadline.
Guarantees Required by Canada and the United States Before 
Free Trade Talks Can Begin
Since January 1986, there have been a number of government to 
government discussion sessions held between Canada and the United 
States. The f irs t  was in San Diego on January 20, a second in Prince 
George B.C. February 12-14 and a third in Washington D C. on March 12. 
These meetings were held to see how far apart the two sides actually 
were from reaching an agreement. The lumber issue was the primary 
concern of the meetings. Since that time, several more sessions have 
been held, and in late August 1986, the Canadian bargaining team set 
down a lis t of guarantees that would have to be agreed to before they 
would be w illing  to s it down and discuss a free trade package w ith the 
United States.
Specifically Canada wants four concessions from the U.S.:
( I ) Relief from protectionist measures, Including quotas, that lim it 
foreign Imports into the United States, plus new rules lim iting the use 
of American trade remedies or penalties like countervailing duties 
now being considered against softwood lumber, anti-dumping and other 
special ta riffs  like those imposed on cedar shakes and shingles.
(2) A reduction in remaining American ta r iffs  on Canadian goods.
(3) Access to buy American programs and other federal and state 
government procurement policies that encourage American agencies to
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prefer American goods and services even when they are more 
expensive than sim ilar foreign goods and services. And, (4) A 
mechanism for settling future trade disputes that would head o ff the 
use of harsh and sometimes arbitrary trade remedy laws (Blinch 
1986).
The United States’ bargaining group has not as yet set down a formal 
lis t of guarantees that i t  w ill require before it  agrees to hammer out a 
free trade package w ith Canada. But you can be sure that an end to 
Canadian lumber subsidies is at the top of the list. As well, Congress 
w ill never relinquish its  power to levy countervailing duties on 
imports deemed to be unfairly subsidized (Tower, September 1986).
The free trade talks between Canada and the United States seem to be 
on hold now, waiting for December 30,1986 when the final judgment 
w ill be passed on whether or not a 15 percent Import ta r if f  should be 
placed on Canadian softwood lumber imports. Canadian offic ia ls 
previously had warned that punitive measures against Canadian lumber 
could Jeopardize delicate negotiations on a free trade pact intended to 
eliminate most trading barriers between the two nations (AP, October 
17, 1986). Whether Canada and the United States continue their free 
trade talks w ill not be decided until January of 1987. If the trade 
talks are continued, they w ill have to be done quickly as Congressional 
authority for the negotiations expires at the beginning of 1988. Any 
deal would have to be presented to Congress by the fa ll of 1987 
because the law gives U.S. legislators 60 working days to examine it  
(Shepherd, 1986).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
Canadian Versus U.S. Arguements on the Need forTrade 
Restrictions on Canadian Softwood Lumber Imports
This section w ill provide the arguments of U.S. Congressional 
supporters of trade restrictions w ith  Canada and the opposing 
arguments of Canadian o ffic ia ls  defending their country's trade 
practices. Each set of arguments w ill be followed by a comments 
section which w ill try  to c la rify  the different issues.
The Level of Canadian Imports to the United States
Point; Canada has substantially increased its  export level of softwood 
lumber to the United States
According to the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, softwood lumber 
production in Canada has increased by 10 billion board feet between 
1975 and 1984, an increase of 103 percent. During the same period, 
U.S. production of softwood lumber increased by 20 percent. The 
Canadian lumber industry has also increased its  share of the U.S. 
lumber market. From 1975 to 1984, Canadian softwood lumber exports 
to the United States rose by more than 7 b illion board feet. In 1975, 
Canada held a 19 percent share of the U.S. softwood lumber market 
while in 1984, Canada's market share was 33 percent.
Counterpoint: Canada has only modestly increased its  export level of 
softwood lumber to the United States
The Canadian government stresses that production of softwood lumber 
in Canada has not increased substantially between 1978 and 1984. In 
1978 Canadian lumber exports were 11.4 billion board feet while in 
1984 they were 13.2 billion board feet, an increase of only 16 percent.
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Canadian o ffic ia ls  feel that the United States Is distorting the 
analysis of the Increasing market share enjoyed by Canada. They argue 
that using 1975 sta tis tics Is misleading as It was a year of low 
Canadian production due to a long strike In the lumber Industry in 
Western Canada. By using 1978 statistics, Canada’s Increase in 
market share In the U.S. Is not substantial. Between 1978 and 1984, 
Canada’s share of the U.S. market increased from 28 percent to 31 
percent, a grand total of 3 percent.
Comment:
Both Canada and the United States agree that the information used to 
analyze the increase in Canadian softwood lumber is for the most part 
correct. However, the discrepency arises over which Information is 
pertinent and what time period should be used to observe trends. In 
their 1985 report on Canadian softwood lumber imports, the ITC used 
1977-1984 to calculate sta tis tics and observe trends, and s t il l found 
that Canadian softwood lumber imports injured U.S. producers.
The Effects of Canadian Softwood Lumber Imports on the U.S.
Lumber industry
Point: Canadian lumber Imports have hurt the U.S. lumber industry
Over the past five years, demand for lumber In the United States has 
Increased yet prices and p ro fitab ility  have declined. Over 600 m ills 
have been closed In the United States In the last eight years, meaning 
the loss of thousands of jobs. The Injury is also apparent In the 
growing trade Imbalance (Imports outweigh exports) between the 
United States and Canada. Senator Max Baucus (D.,Montana) made the 
following points in a Senate committee testimony:
( 1 ) Since 1980, the Industry has gone from a $400 million trade 
surplus to a $2 b illion trade deficit.
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(2) Although softwood lumber consumption reached an a ll-tim e 
high level of 43 billion board feet in 1984, U.S. sawmills are 
operating at only 83 percent of capacity.
(3) Since 1978, 250 sawmills have closed and 30 000 U.S. lumber 
industry workers have lost their jobs (Maly, DalSaglio, and 
McKinsey, 1986).
In July 1985, the Chairman of the U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber Import 
reported to the ITC that if  Canadian lumber imports continue to flood 
into the United States, the resulting decline of the return on capital 
w ill prevent continued investments in the U.S. softwood lumber 
industry. The U.S. Department of Agriculture requested the Idaho 
Forest Industry Council to compile information on the cost of 
manufacturing softwood lumber. The Council provided a graph entitled 
Lumber Cost-Price Squeeze, shown in Figure 9. Since 1980, the 
average selling value of lumber in the United States has dipped and 
remains below the average costs for manufacturing, logging and 
stumpage. The Council concludes that the reason for the decline can be 
based partially on increasing manufacturing costs and the current 
depressed price for lumber due to the greater supply of inexpensive 
Canadian lumber (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986).
Counterpoint: The lumber industry is suffering in both Canada and the 
United States
The Canadian lumber industry is suffering from the same problems as 
the U.S. industry. M ill closures, job losses and low pro fit margins are 
all visible in Canada’s lumber industry. Nationwide, the lumber 
industry accounts for one in every ten jobs in Canada, therefore having 
a great impact on the country’s economy. During the recession of the 
early I980’s, employment in the Canadian lumber industry dropped 
between 30 and 40 percent below the normal level. High levels of debt 
at high interest rates have combined to ravage corporate balance
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sheets. Capital expenditures for 1983 were estimated at $1.4 billion 
for the forest industry, about half the annual level of the 1980-82 
period. In short, what started out as a severe cyclical downturn has 
had longer-term effects w ith severe structural implications for the 
Canadian industry (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
Comment:
The United States government and the U.S. lumber industry are blaming 
Canadian lumber imports for the decline in prices, p ro fitab ility  and 
jobs prevalent in the U.S. industry. Canada's argument is that their 
industry is suffering too and that other possible reasons for the 
decline, such as structural changes in the industry and domestic 
economic conditions , should be investigated (Maly, DalSaglio and 
McKinsey, 1986).
Exchange Rates
Point: Exchange rate increases do not account for the total increase in 
Canadian lumber imports into the United States
Since 1976, the value of the U.S. dollar in comparison to the value of 
the Canadian dollar has risen from below par ($ 1.00) to approximately 
$ 1.40 Canadian ( 1986). American government o ffic ia ls  do agree that 
the strong U.S. dollar is partially responsible for the increase in 
Canadian lumber exports to the United States. Senator Max baucus said 
The overvalued dollar contributes significantly to the problem by 
making imports cheap and exports expensive. But U.S. offic ia ls want 
to make sure that subsidies by the Canadian government are not over­
looked, They feel that these subsidies have as much effect on the 
lumber trade imbalance as exchange rates do.
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Counterpoint: There Is a direct correlation between the increase In 
Canadian lumber exports to the United States and the 
value of the U.S. dollar.
Canadian o ffic ia ls  state that the strong value of the U.S. dollar which 
stands at approximately $ 1.40 Canadian is the major cause of the price 
advantage Canadian lumber producers are currently enjoying. To prove 
this point, one only has to look at the relationship over the last 
several years between the Canadian share of the U.S. market and the 
value of the U.S. dollar, shown In Figure 10. Even some American 
offic ia ls agree that there is a direct correlation between increases in 
Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. and the value of the U.S. dollar. 
Congressman James Weaver stated, currently the most significant 
influence on Canadian lumber imports to the U.S. is the exchange rate, 
Morris Udall in a 1984 report to the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular A ffa irs said, The single most important factor affecting 
lumber imports Into the United States at the present time is the 
exchange rate.
Comment:
While the two governments disagree on the perspective of this point, 
evidence has been given to substantiate Canada's claim that exchange 
rates have a substantial e ffect on the lumber trade between Canada 
and the United States. The value of the Canadian dollar cannot, 
however, fu lly  explain Canada's cost advantages. It is the opportunity 
to sell In the American market that gives the Canadian lumber industry 
Its advantage over the U.S. 1ndustry-as a direct result of the dollar 
disparity (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986).
In the ITC’s 1985 report, i t  was estimated that the difference in real 
(versus inflated) dollars between Canada and the United States gave 
Canada an 11 percent exchange rate advantage. Thus any Canadian firm
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that can pay for raw materials and other production costs in Canadian 
dollars and turn around and sell the finished product in American 
dollars, is going to have an advantage over a U.S. competitor.
Contrary to uniformed opinion, the exchange rate differential is 
largely the result of high public deficits and interest rates rather than 
a consequence of deliberate Canadian policy to keep their dollar value 
low. The two national currencies are closely tied and Canadian 
producers have suffered the same impacts of overvaluation as their 
U.S. competitors (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
The Effect of Different Approaches to Stumpage
Point: Canadian stumpage prices constitute a subsidy to the Canadian 
lumber industry
A large number of U.S. government o ffic ia ls  feel that the price the 
Canadian government charges for stumpage constitutes a subsidy to 
the Canadian lumber Industry. U.S. o ffic ia ls  argue that Canadian 
stumpage fees do not represent fa ir market value of the standing 
timber and that these undervalued stumpage fees are causing unfair 
competition. According to Senator Max Baucus, the U.S. industry has 
been inundated by Canadian imports that benefit from massive 
government subsidies, in the past, the U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber 
Imports has used the issue of low Canadian stumpage prices to 
petition the ITC to rule if  countervailing duties should be placed on 
Canadian lumber imports.
Counterpoint: Stumpage by itse lf does not account for all the costs of 
harvesting timber
Canadian o ffic ia ls  feel that the emphasis placed on stumpage fees, and 
the cost difference between Canada and the United States, is exag­
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gerated. When all the costs of timber management are considered 
(stumpage, reforestation, road building, cuttung, hauling and taxes) the 
Canadian softwood lumber industry does not have a notable cost 
advantage over the US, softwood lumber industry. The main reason for 
this is that in Canada the company that buys the rights to cut Crown 
Land also endures the cost for road building and reforestation. In the 
United States these jobs are done by the U.S. Forest Service.
Comment;
Canadian firms can sell lumber cheaper than American firms. Everyone 
agrees w ith this fact, but there is disagreement when it  comes to the 
reason why. U.S. o ffic ia ls  stress that stumpage prices constitute a 
subsidy. But neither country can agree on the Importance of such 
things as efficiency, productivity, transportation costs and forest 
management policies. A recent study by the International Wood­
workers of America (IWA), a union representing about 100 000 
workers on both sides of the border, shows that Canadian m ill workers 
on an average produce about 65 percent more lumber than their U.S. 
counterparts (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). The IWA report 
shows that the difference in productivity Is due to state of the art 
technology and equipment and economies of scale at the larger 
Canadian mills.
In the 1982 report by the ITC, It concluded that Canadian stumpage 
fees did not give the Canadian lumber industry an advantage over the 
U.S. lumber Industry because the delivered price of logs to the m ill 
were comparable. The 1985 ITC report changed that decision. It 
reversed the estimates of the logs delivered to the m ill and found the 
average U.S. price to be $205 while the average Canadian price was 
$166. This means that despite more d iff ic u lt terrain, longer hauls and 
sparser timber stands, Canadian m ills  delivered prices of logs Is 
cheaper. Therefore, It can be assumed that lower stumpage prices 
allow the Canadian lumber Industry to undersell the U.S. lumber 
industry.
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Canadian Market Penetration
Point: The Canadian governments change the market price of lumber to 
maintain production and jobs
The Canadian government has a practice of offering low stumpage fees 
to Canadian lumber firm s to help keep m ills  open and stop 
unemployment in the lumber industry. Because of this, Canadian 
production has been able to increase over the period 1977-84 and 
penetrate the U.S. lumber market to a greater extent. U.S. o ffic ia ls 
have referred to this practice as a "welfare system" and a major 
reason for revised trade legislation.
Counterpoint; Canadian government policy remains the same between 
1977 and 1984
Canada has not changed any of its  ploicies dealing w ith the lumber 
industry between 1977 and 1984, therefore, the increased U.S. market 
penetration of Canadian lumber must be attributed to some other 
cause. In the past, the Canadian share of the U.S. market has 
correlated w ith housing starts in the United States. The increase in 
market share of Canadian lumber reflects an increase in U.S. housing 
starts. When in 1981-82 U.S. housing starts fe ll off, so did the 
Canadian market share of the U.S. lumber market. Other factors to 
consider are exchange rates, efficiency of Canadian m ills  and 
increased demand for Canadian lumber products in areas other than the 
new home construction market (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986),
Comment:
Low stumpage fees in Canada and an overall low price for lumber have 
caused an Increased demand for Canadian lumber in the United States. 
While Canadian stumpage remains at a consistently low level, 
American producers are forced to pay fa ir market value for timber
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rights. This difference allows Canadian producers to sell lumber 
cheaper than American producers can, thus causing Increased 
purchases of Canadian lumber in the United States. It is true that 
Canada has not changed its  policy on stumpage between 1977 and 1984 
but Canadian stumpage prices may have been too low to begin with.
Forest Management Policies
Point; Canadian forest management policies are inconsistent w ith a 
policy of sustainable yield
U.S. o ffic ia ls  are upset because the Canadian stumpage system does 
not follow the same rules as the U.S. stumpage system. The U.S. feels 
that Canada's policy does not guarantee reforestation. By doing so, 
Canada is essentially "mining" its  timber resources to the ultimate 
detriment of its  forest products industry (Maly, DalSaglio and 
McKinsey, 1986),
Canadian stumpage fees are lower than U.S. fees because the Canadian 
system sees trees for harvest only whereas the U.S. system puts 
timber in competition w ith  other uses, therefore causing a higher 
stumpage fee In the U.S. There are feelings on both sides of the border 
that continuation of Canada’s present stumpage system w ill lead to 
the ruin of its  forest products Industry. Continuation of present levels 
of regeneration, stand improvement and resource protection w ill 
precipitate a decline from current levels of wood production (Canadian 
Pulp and Paper Association, 1985).
Counterpoint: Canadian forest management policies are consistent 
w ith a policy of sustainable yield
The Canadian viewpoint is that its  forest management policies do 
constitute a reasonable harvest/reforestation rate to guarantee a
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sustained yield, Their view is that lower stumpage fees are 
reasonable on land containing sparse, low quality timber or on land in 
remote areas (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986), Since much of 
Canada's forestland fa lls  into this category, stumpage fees are 
reasonable.
Canada follows a forest management policy consistent w ith its 
resource base and should not be governed by conditions In the United 
States. In fact, Canada has more productive forestland (544 million 
acres) than the U.S. has commercial forestland(482 m illion acres). 
Along w ith this, Canada has 550 billion cubic feet of softwood 
inventory while the US, maintains only 456 billion cubic feet (Maly, 
DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986). This means that Canada can afford to 
have a higher rate of harvest than the United States, yet presently, it 
only harvests about 68 percent as much timber as the United States 
(21 billion board feet as compared to 31 billion board feet).
Comment:
Although canada harvests more timber stands than the U.S. does, it  
must be remembered that Canada can afford to do so as its  domestic 
requirements are only 10 percent the size of domestic needs In the 
United States. If sustained yield is a policy meant to insure adequate 
timber supplies indefinitely, then Canada is in a far better position 
than the United States to risk overharvest. The United States, In the 
long run, has a far greater problem of guaranteeing a sustainable yield 
for domestic purposes (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). Canada 
has less reason to adopt the U.S. philosophy on forest management 
because of its  large size and small population. Canada is concerned 
about forest management but it  should not be bound by U.S. standards 
reflecting greater population density and less remote resources (Maly, 
DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
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Loophole in U.S. Trade Laws
Point: A loophole in the U.S. trade laws allows subsidized Canadian 
lumber to enter the United States
The 1982 ITC report found that Canadian stumpage practices gave 
Canadian producers an advantage over their U.S. counterparts.
However, the U.S. Commerce Department rejected the petition for a 
countervail action because the advantage enjoyed by the Canadian 
softwood lumber Industry was available throughout the Canadian 
economy to a broad array of wood products firms. Because of this,
S. 1292, Natural Resource Subsidies was proposed. S. 1292 would 
ammend U.S. countervailing duty law to clearly establish that a 
subsidy exists when a government, acting through a controlled or 
regulated entity, sells an Input product or sells or grants the right to 
remove or extract an Input product to domestic industries at a price 
that is below market value for such inputs or removal rights (Senator 
Baucus’ Office, 1986).
Counterpoint: Canadian stumpage rates are the same for both foreign 
and Canadian producers and for both foreign and Canadian 
markets
Even though provincial stumpage rates are low in comparrison to those 
in the United States they cannot be regarded as a subsidy under U.S. 
law because they are ‘generally available' in Canada to domestic 
producers and exporters alike; there is no tw o -tie r’ pricing structure 
that leads to export dumping’ and U.S. companies avail themselves of 
the same stumpage rates as Canadian companies. O fficial studies in 
the United States have confirmed that stumpage practices do not 
confer a subsidy on the export of softwood lumber (Maly, DalSaglio, 
and McKinsey, 1986).
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Canada's o ffic ia l reaction to 5,1292 is that since the U S, critics could 
not find an unlawful subsidy in the Canadian softwood lumber industry, 
they would change the law so that any difference that makes a foreign 
product more competitive is unlawful. The effect of the b ill is to put 
everything in terms of U.S. standards. This is unrealistic when you 
consider that not every country has the same standard of living, 
resource base and environmental goals as the United States. Canada 
believes that S. 1292 would place at risk all international trade, 
including that of the U.S., and that it  is a substantial departure from 
international rule and practice and sets up a fa ir market value 
benchmark for input products which is impossible to measure w ith any 
objectivity (Diplomatic note 320).
Comment;
A 1985 study by the Congressional Budget Office shows the possible 
effects of ammending the U.S. countervailing duty law. S. 1292 would 
broaden the lis t of foreign government policies that are subject to 
countervailing duties to include the use of natural resources inputs at 
less than free market prices. The study also agrees w ith Canada's 
position that S. 1292 could hurt international trade. Using U.S. prices 
to determine the fa ir market value of natural resources would present 
several problems, Generally the U.S. enjoys different productive 
capabilities than other countries and has different patterns of supply 
and demand. Using U.S. prices would negate these very substantial 
differences and could lead to misa!location of resources to the 
detriment of both U.S. consumers and foreign nations.
Fair Lumber Markets
Point: U.S. lumber producers are being driven out of their own market 
by cheap Canadian imports
Between 1975 and 1985, Canada's share of the U.S. lumber market 
grew from approximately 19 percent to over 33 percent, as seen in
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Figure 11. Because of this increase, domestic production has 
decreased in the U.S. Thus U.S. producers are being driven out of their 
own market.
FIGURE 11
REGIONAL MARKET SHARE OF 
U.S. LUMBER CONSUMPTION
NM«I 9 .4K
1975 1985 (9 mo#.)
Counterpoint: Canadian lumber imports complement the U.S. market
Canada should not be compared w ith  countries who "dump" products 
into U.S. markets. In the past, Canada has been a w illing  supplier of 
lumber products to the United States, responding to formal government 
requests to maintain or increase lumber exports to help maintain the 
growth in the U.S. housing market. It is not appropriate for the United 
States to undermine Canada's lumber industry which is specially 
scaled to respond to U.S. needs (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986).
Comment:
Canada's lumber industry is geared for large levels of exports to the 
United States, mainly because in the past the U.S. has formally
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requested that Canada increase its  lumber exports to the U.S. It is 
d ifficu lt to ask a country to decrease its  exports when it  has been 
constantly asked to increase its  exports in the past.
implications of Free Trade Decisions on the Canadian and U.S.
Lumber Industries
This section w ill discuss the possible effects on the Canadian and U.S. 
lumber industries if a free trade agreement is signed between Canada 
and the United States. It w ill also discuss the possible outcomes 
should free trade talks fa il and trade restrictions be imposed.
If free trade is achieved between Canada and the United States, i t  w ill 
mean an end to duties and ta r iffs  and nontariff barriers that are now 
in place to protect domestic industries in both countries. Free trade 
w ill mean that any product made in North America (Canada or the 
United States) could be sold anywhere w ithin North America at the 
price the selling firm  deems competitive. For example, a lumber firm  
in Alberta could sell its  lumber to a housing contractor in Miami at the 
price it  would sell i t  to a housing contractor in Calgary. No duties or 
ta riffs  would be placed on the lumber.
Assuming free trade negotiations are successful, there w ill be an 
increase in the variety of products available. The types of trees grown 
in Canada and the United States d iffe r in species and, due to the colder 
climate in Canada, they also d iffe r in strength (Northern trees tend to 
have tighter rings which tend to make them stronger). In other words, 
Canadian lumber products are different than those found in the United 
States. Free trade would allow products not normally found in a
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region to become available In that market. This would help the lumber 
industries In both countries as they could supply the needs of both 
Canada and the U.S., and i t  would benefit consumers as It would 
Increase the variety of products to choose from,
With Increased trade comes increased efficiency in manufacturing. In 
order to remain competitive, firm s on both sides of the border w ill 
have to increase their efficiency and in turn lower their prices to 
meet competition. Because new equipment would be required to meet 
new efficiency standards, the Canadian lumber industry would 
probably be in a more advantageous position than the U.S. lumber 
industry because over the past ten years Canadian firms have replaced 
old equipment w ith modern, more effic ient, equipment while U.S. firms 
have continued to use the same equipment. The increased competition 
would lower lumber prices to both Canadian and U.S. consumers.
Because of the competitive nature that a free trade agreement 
between Canada and the United States would produce, more efficient 
means of lumber production would have to be used. To make the 
lumber industry more effic ient, new machinery would have to be used 
and lumber companies would have to reduce their costs to remain price 
competitive. Increased efficiency tends to coincide w ith decreased 
employment As machines take over the jobs of many unskilled 
laborers, companies w ill have to let workers go. A recent report by 
MTN News stated that the loss of jobs In Montana alone could reach 
into the thousands and that unemployed workers would probably seek 
jobs in the secondary lumber market. Both the Canadian and U S. 
lumber industries see a decrease in employment if  a free trade 
agreement Is signed between the two nations.
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Under the present system, the United States exports almost no lumber 
products to Canada. Some Maine logs head for eastern Canada but the 
wood products generally return to the United States (Maly, DalSagllo, 
and McKlnsey, 1986). Free trade would allow U.S. lumber firms to sell 
their products in Canada without restrictions and allow Canadian 
consumers to take advantage of the different types of lumber 
available. The U.S. lumber industry could increase its  non-domestic 
sales. There is also the possibility of the two industries joining 
forces to penetrate markets in other countries, thus opening third 
country market opportunities.
Free trade tends to lower prices because industries become more 
efficient, in Canada and the United States, the largest consumer of 
lumber products is the housing industry. As prices decrease, due to 
free trade, savings can be passed on to homeowners. The decreased 
cost of house building w ill encourage more people to build homes.
While this fact w ill help the housing industries in both countries, it  
w ill also help the lumber industries in both countries as there is a 
direct correlation between housing starts and the amount of lumber 
sold. Costs to other users of wood products such as furniture makers 
w ill also go down. The benefits w ill be fe lt throughout the economy.
Maintaining long term supply is a concern in the United States where 
lumber demand is high and resources are slowly depleting. By allowing 
another country (in this case Canada) to provide cheap lumber 
resources, the United States would be able to conserve its  lumber 
resources for higher value uses such as recreation or future 
consumption. Canada has large areas of productive resources (larger 
than those in the United States) yet its  domestic demand is only 
one-tenth the size of U.S. domestic demand.
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Free trade would reduce regulatory costs as no agencies would be 
required to stop or place ta r iffs  on imports from Canada Into the 
United States or vice versa. Presently some states and provinces do 
Impose bans on certain types of lumber. This process would be 
eliminated under a free trade agreement between the two nations.
Assuming free trade talks fa ll and trade restrictions are Imposed, 
costs to manufacturers are bound to Increase. U.S. lumber Is more 
expensive than Canadian lumber, if  the United States were to impose a 
ta r if f  on Canadian lumber to make It price competitive w ith U.S. 
lumber, the Increased cost would be passed on to manufacturers who 
presently use Canadian softwood lumber (mainly In the housing 
Industry). This would mean Increased housing costs in the United 
States which In turn would mean fewer housing starts. As mentioned 
earlier, housing starts are directly correlated to the amount of lumber 
sold. If housing starts decrease, so does the lumber market. By 
placing restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports, the United 
States could be cutting its  own lumber Industry’s throat.
By restricting Canadian softwood lumber imports, the United States 
w ill be forced to use domestic supplies of lumber to meet demand. 
Today, Canadian lumber meets 33 percent of total U.S. needs or about 
15 billion board feet of lumber per year. There Is some doubt as to 
whether the U.S. lumber industry can maintain a sustained yield under 
present conditions. Taking 15 billion board feet of lumber a year out 
of the reserves could destroy the future of the lumber Industry.
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As domestic supplies of lumber are decreased, the remaining timber 
stands w ill become more valuable. Since timber stands are owned 
predominently by private firm s in the United States, stumpage prices 
are bound to rise. The effect of this w ill be that market prices of 
lumber w ill rise. As market prices increase, cheaper products such as 
plastics w ill be considered as alternatives for lumber, thus reducing 
the demand for lumber and hurting the U.S. lumber Industry.
As more restrictions are placed on Canadian softwood lumber imports 
to the United States, more agencies w ill have to be put in place to 
assure that the restrictions are enforced. Additional customs 
enforcement costs of $ 100 000-$ 150 000 per year have been 
estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (Maly, DalSaglio and 
McKlnsey, 1986). That figure Is for enforcement of the restrictions 
alone, not for discussing or studying the restrictions which is paid out 
of taxpayers money as well. Regulatory costs in the m illions of 
dollars could be endured by the United States, if  trade restrictions 
were placed on Canadian softwood lumber.
The major concern of placing trade restrictions on Canada’s softwood 
lumber imports is retaliation by the Canadian government. Some U.S. 
o ffic ia ls  feel that Canada w ill not retaliate. Senator John Melcher (D., 
Montana) said that Canada is taking advantage of Uncle Sam" and that 
lumber restrictions like the recent 15 percent duty placed on Canadian 
softwood lumber "w ill not spoil our relationship w ith them (Canada). 
However, Canada has responded to the recent lumber ta riffs . Although 
saying It  was not a retaliatory measure, the Canadian government 
Imposed a duty on U.S. corn exports to Canada in November 1986. 
Placing trade restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports would 
have a devastating effect on Canada's v ita lly  important lumber 
industry, and retaliation should be expected. If the United States were 
to continue to place restrictions on Canadian lumber, more retaliatory
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restrictions would be inevitable on Canada’s part, The bad feelings 
built up over a situation like this could have enormous effects on 
diplomatic ties between the two nations as well. The cooperation, 
communication and friendship that Canada and the United States have 
enjoyed in the past would be damaged.
While there are no obvious answers to the problem of burgeoning 
Canadian exports and corresponding market share reductions for some 
domestic producers, a mutually beneficial alternative to protection 
and retaliation is clearly what the two countries should pursue. 
Government o ffic ia ls  in both countries have suggested working more 
closely together to expand and secure overseas markets for North 
American forest products in general. This approach seems sensible in 
light of the fact that both U.S. and Canada exporters suffer from the 
penalty of overvalued currencies. Following through w ith this 
approach would, however, require a much more cooperative attitude 
than is presently visible and arrangements to preclude the issue of 
’unfair" competition from spreading into new market areas (Maly, 
DalSaglio, and McKlnsey, 1986),
Implications of a Canada-U.S. Accord For U.S. Trade With Other
Trading Partners
Before the turn of the twentieth century, over 80 percent of U.S. 
exports went to European nations, w ith  Great Britain as one of the 
largest consumers of U.S. goods. Today only about 30 percent of U.S. 
exports are sent to Europe. While European export markets have 
decreased, Asian markets have increased. Between 1900 and 1985, 
exports to Japan have increased from less than one percent to more 
than 30 percent.
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Import percentages have changed as well. In the early twentieth 
century, Europe accounted for over 50 percent of the Imports to the 
United States. Asia on the other hand, has increased its  imports to the 
United States from 15 percent in the early 1900‘s to almost 35 
percent today, making Japan the second largest exporter to the United 
States next to Canada. 1980 sta tis tics show Japan exporting $30.8 
b illion of products to the United States and importing $20.8 billion 
from the United States. Great Britain exported $9.8 b illion to the 
United States in 1980 and Imported $12.8 b illion from the United 
States. Figure 12 shows the leading trade partners of the U.S. in 1980,
FIGURE 12
Leading Trading Partners of the United States 1980
Major Customers $ Billions Major Suppliers S Billions
1. Canada 35.5 1. Canada 41.5
2. Japan 20.8 2. Japan 30.8
3. Mexico 15.2 3. Mexico 12.6
4. United Kingdom 12.8 4. Germany 11.7
5. Germany 11.1 • 5. United Kingdom 9.8
6. France 7.6 6 Venezuela 5.3
7. Italy 5.7 7. France 5.3
8. Venezuela 4.7 8. Italy 4.4
9. Brazil 4.4 9. Brazil 3.8
10. Australia 4.2 10. South Africa 3.4
Source: Survey Current Business (November 1981), 18-20.
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A free trade agreement between Canada and the United states could 
have definite effects on U.S. trade policies w ith other nations. Free 
trade w ill cause increased trade activ ity  between Canada and the 
United States. Canadian products that had previously been restricted 
from entering the United States or that had duties placed on them w ill 
now be available to American consumers. This could allow Canadian 
firm s to steal market share away from other import countries like 
Japan and Great Britain. Instead of buying technology from Japan, it  
may now be cheaper to buy i t  from Canada. Britain could lose some of 
the U.S. export market share i f  Canada were able to sell petroleum at 
lower prices. With Canada already the U.S.'s largest trade partner, a 
free trade deal between the two countries could open the door to 
Canadaian firm s to a much greater extent. If th is were to happen, 
export nations like Japan and Great Britain could be severely hurt by 
the decreased U.S. export market share.
American firm s w ill become more effic ient under a free trade 
agreement because they w ill be openly competing w ith Canadian firms. 
This new efficiency level w ill cause prices to drop and possibly make 
products, normally Imported from other countries, cheaper to produce 
in the U.S. Consumers may choose to buy cheaper American goods 
rather than import more expensive products. Therefore, U.S. trade 
partners face a possible reduction in their U.S. export market because 
of domestic U.S. domestic producers as well.
Finally, countries like Japan and Great Britain may be forced to 
negotiate a free trade agreement of their own w ith the United States. 
If Canada begins to take away their export markets, they w ill have to 
do something to try  to stop the decay. A free trade agreement sim ilar 
to one that would be signed between Canada and the United States 
could return the U.S.'s other trading partners to their former level of 
importance. However, there is a negative side to countries like Japan 
agreeing to free trade w ith the United States. Presently, Japan places 
a large number of restrictions on trade w ith foreign countries. If
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Japan were to come to an agreement sim ilar to that being discussed 
between Canada and the United States, it  would have to remove most 
of these barriers, Japan is an extremely protectionist nation and it  is 
possible that i t  would not want to remove the ta r iffs  it  now has in 
place. While Great Britain is not as protectionist in nature as Japan, 
i t  too would have to agree to remove a number of trade restrictions in 
a free trade agreement w ith the U.S. It is unknown whether Japan or 
Great Britain would be w illing to remove their present trade 
restrictions on U.S. imports. If not, then a free trade arrangement 
between the U.S. and Japan or the U.S. and Great Britain would be 
unlikely.
If free trade fa lls  between Canada and the United States, the door may 
open for other U.S. trading partners to capture some of Canada’s export 
market to the United States. If free trade Is not achieved it  is likely 
that trade restrictions w ill be put in place by the United States 
government. These restrictions could cause hard feelings between the 
two countries and cause retaliatory actions to be taken by Canada.
Once retaliation began, it  could turn into a vicious cycle of ta riffs  and 
counter ta riffs  to the detriment of both nations.
America's other trade partners w ill be anxiously awaiting the decision 
or free trade between Canada and the United States. No matter what 
the outcome, it  is likely they w ill be affected.
Chap te r Summary
The demand for lumber in the United States is increasing. 1986 w ill 
set a consumption record, fo r the third year in a row. The long term 
demand projections of the 1970's are beginning to pan out. Yet, w ith 
the increased consumption of wood products, producers' profits are not 
at the level indicative of frantic economic activ ity (NFPA, May, 1986).
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U.S. companies are operating w ith margins that are nowhere near the 
levels enjoyed during the 1970‘s housing boom. Figure 13 compares 
U.S. lumber consumption and lumber prices.
The cause of low prices and m ill closures is an abundance of domestic 
supply coupled w ith increased Imports from Canada and continued high 
production levels in U.S. m ills. Figure 14 shows Canadian market share 
in the U.S., and Figure 15 compares Canadian lumber production to the 
Canadian share of the U.S. market. Added to this is the fact that 
stumpage charges in Canada (the price paid to the Canadian government 
for use of Crown Land) are much lower than in the United States, as 
shown in Figure 16, and therefore Canadian firm s have an advantage 
over U.S. firms. Exchange rates are another factor in discovering the 
reason for the low price of lumber in a boom period. If a Canadian
FIGURE 13
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firm  sells lumber in the United States for $1 Canadian, the U.S. 
consumer only pays $.70 U.S. because of the exchange rate. With the 
low price of Canadian lumber along w ith a high value of the U.S. dollar, 
Canadian lumber becomes cheaper than domestic lumber In the U.S., 
thus driving the overall price of lumber down and decreasing the profit 
margins of U.S. firms. In turn, some m ills  havebeen forced out of 
business In the United States. Between 1977 and 1984, the U.S. 
International Trade Commission has reported a net loss of 629 U.S. 
softwood sawmill and planing plants, an 18 percent drop. By contrast, 
during the same period, Canadian sawmills Increased by 85, a 9 
percent increase (Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, January 20,
1986). Figure 17 shows the lumber producing establishments in 
Canada and the U.S. from 1977 to 1984.
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FIGURE 15
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FIGURE 17
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Because Canadian lumber Imports are so visibly damaging the U.S. 
lumber Industry, it  Is no wonder that the Canadian lumber Imports are 
at the forefront of the free trade discussions between Canada and the 
United States.
If free trade is achieved between the two nations, a number of 
advantages and disadvantages w ill be realized by both lumber 
Industries. New markets w ill be opened up, more effic ient plants w ill 
be built, workforce requirements w ill be reduced and domestic 
resources (especially In the United States) can be conserved. If free 
trade Is not achieved, the U.S. Is likely to continue Its policy of trade 
restrictions. This could harm the U.S. lumber Industry by causing a
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decrease in domestic supplies of lumber, increased stumpage fees and 
the possible use of cheaper substitute products.
There are also implications for other trading partners of the United 
States. They face the possibility of Canada capturing a portion of 
their export market in the U.S.. Free trade w ill mean increased trade 
activ ity  between Canada and the United States and products normally 
imported to the U.S. from other nations may now be imported from 
Canada.
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CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
Free trade has become the center of attention in both Canada and the 
United States over the past year. The two nations have expressed 
their desires to reach a jo in t agreement on free trade. Several 
preliminary sessions have been held between the two negotiating 
teams, but no date has been set for formal talks to begin. The two 
nations have until the fa ll of 1987 to reach an agreement (the deadline 
was placed on U.S. President Ronald Reagan by the U.S. Congress). If no 
agreement is reached by that time, the U.S. side w ill have to resubmit 
its  request to Congress to allow negotiations between Canada and the 
United States to continue.
The main issue which is presently holding up the trade talks is lumber. 
The U.S. accuses Canada of subsidizing its  softwood lumber industry by 
charging stumpage fees that are well below fa ir market value. This 
action causes Canadian lumber to be less expensive and because of 
this, exports from Canada to the U.S. have dramatically increased over 
the last ten years.
In 1982, a U.S. ITC report stated that Canadian lumber exports to the 
United States were causing an injury to the U.S. lumber industry. But 
the U.S. Commerce Department decided that Canadian stumpage prices 
did not constitute a subsidy to the Canadian lumber Industry.
Therefore no ta r iffs  could be placed on Canadian softwood lumber 
imports. In 1985, the U.S. ITC reviewed their 1982 report and again 
found that Canadian lumber exports were causing injury to the U.S. 
lumber industry. This time, the U.S. Commerce Department found that
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Stumpage prices did constitute a subsidy and reversed Its earlier 
decision.
The recent preliminary decision of October 16,1986 by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce levied a 15 percent ta r if f  on Canadian 
softwood lumber. The Department's final decision w ill be made on 
December 30, 1986. The Canadian government and softwood lumber 
industry deny that Canadian stumpage fees amount to a subsidy. They 
argue that since these fees are offered to a variety of producers, both 
Canadian and export, and that the price is the same whether the lumber 
is for domestic or export use, that Canadian producers are not being 
subsidized. Canadians also point out that exchange rates favoring the 
U.S. and the efficiency of Canadian m ills  also cause Canadian softwood 
lumber prices to be lower than U.S. softwood lumber prices.
There are serious implications to consider if  Canada and the United 
States go ahead w ith  free trade plans as well as serious implications 
i f  the trade talks fa il. Free trade w ill bring an increased variety of 
products and lower prices while decreasing the lumber industries 
workforce. However, by buying cheap Canadian lumber, the United 
States could conserve its  own lumber supply and guarantee a 
sustainable yield for the future. If trade talks between the two 
countries fa il, i t  is likely that the United States w ill impose trade 
restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports to the U.S.. 
Presently, Canada f i l ls  about one-third of the U.S. domestic need. 
Having to supply domestic lumber requirements could cause the U.S. to 
fa ll below a level of sustainable yield needed to guarantee future 
lumber supplys. Restrictions could also increase the price of lumber 
which in the U.S. is directly correlated to stumpage fees. Therefore, 
stumpage fees are likely to increase if  restrictions are imposed. By 
placing trade restrictions on Canadian lumber, the U.S. also leaves 
itse lf open for retaliation. Canada's lumber industry is v ita lly  
important to that country's economy and it  is reasonable to believe 
that Canada would retaliate in some form.
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Free trade appears to be the most beneficial path for both countries. 
But unless an agreement can be reached on the lumber dispute, it  is 
like ly that trade restrictions w ill be put in place by U.S. officials.
The free trade issue has also implications for America's other trading 
partners to consider. A free trade agreement w ith Canada could lessen 
the amounts of exports the U.S. buys from countries other than Canada. 
It could also force countries like Japan and Great Britain to negotiate 
a free trade agreement w ith the U.S. themselves, Whether or not Japan 
or Great Britain would be w illing  to remove their present 
protectionist ta r iffs  is unknown, but i t  is certain that neither country 
would be able to reach a free trade agreement w ith the U.S. (sim ilar to 
the one Canada and the U.S. are Discussing) unless they did remove the 
majority of their ta r iffs  on foreign imports, i f  free trade is not 
achieved and trade restrictions are imposed by the U.S. on Canada, 
retaliation could occur. Potentially, the U.S.'s other trade partners 
could gain any lost export market share in the U.S. that Canada might 
experience.
Conç]y,.slon.s
In terms of the free trade talks between Canada and the United States, 
several conclusions can be drawn from this paper. This section w ill 
examine such conclusions.
Differences over the lumber dispute have caused the delay in free 
trade negotiations. Both sides feel that lumber is an issue that must 
be settled before any trade talks can begin. The United States has 
accused Canada of subsidizing its  lumber industry by charging low 
stumpage fees on Crown Land. Canada argues that stumpage prices do 
not cause a subsidy and that when all of the costs to harvest timber in
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Canada are considered (transportation costs, sparse timber areas) the 
Canadian lumber industry does not have an advantageous position over 
their U.S. counterparts. The recent findings of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce disagree w ith Canada's position. The Commerce Department 
found that Canadian stumpage prices did constitute a subsidy to 
Canadian lumber firm s and it  imposed a 15 percent duty on Canadian 
softwood lumber imports to the U.S. The final decision on the duty 
w ill be made on December 30, 1986. The outcome w ill have a great 
impact on the future of free trade talks between Canada and the United 
States.
When the U.S. accuses Canada of setting stumpage prices too low, 
Canada is being judged by U.S. standards. Unfortunately, things are not 
the same in Canada as they are in the United States. Canada is a much 
more remote land w ith a colder climate, shorter growing season and 
sparser timber stands. Therefore, the timber harvested by Canadian 
producers is generally smaller than the timber harvested in the U.S. 
Also, because timber stands are so sparse in Canada, fewer trees are 
harvested from each timber stand in Canada than in the U.S.. Canadian 
stumpage fees should be based on Canadian standards, not American. 
This is the only way that an accurate assessment of Canada's 
stumpage fees could be made.
Stumpage fees are not the only area where Canada is judged by 
American standards. When U.S. o ffic ia ls  talk about free trade w ith 
Canada, they speak in terms of the U.S. way of thinking. They do not 
seem to realize that other countries do not do things in the same 
manner as the U.S. Senator Russell Long was quoted as saying I have 
hope of getting the government of Canada to agree to trade rules that 
are consistent w ith  those we have learned to live w ith  in the United 
States.
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A free trade agreement w ill be beneficial to both Canada and the 
United States. With free trade, the potential markets for Industries In 
both nations increase. Canadian firm s have been waiting for the day 
when they could compete for U.S. government contracts.
Free trade w ill allow these Canadian firms to compete against U.S. 
firm s for these contracts. The U.S. can benefit from a free trade 
agreement w ith Canada because Canada has an abundance of natural 
resources which the United States could use. Domestic requirements 
for natural resources In the U.S. are enormous. The United States could 
guarantee a sustained yield of natural resources by buying cheap 
Canadian resources. A free trade agreement would benefit both Canada 
and the United States.
Protectionist feelings are growing In the United States as can be seen 
by the over 300 pieces of protectionist legislation now before the U.S. 
Congress. If free trade talks fa il between Canada and the United 
states, the U.S. is likely to impose trade restrictions on Canada. The 
main Issue holding up the trade talks presently is the export of 
Canadian lumber. The U.S. has already placed an import ta r if f  on 
Canadian Shakes and Shingles and has moved to place a ta r if f  on 
Canadian softwood lumber Imports. The U.S. trend in in placing ta r iffs  
on Canadian lumber is likely to continue.
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A free trade agreement must be reached between Canada and the 
United States before the fa ll of 1987 (due to restrictions placed on 
the U.S. bargaining team by the U.S. Congress). Presently, the 
negotiations are stalemated over the issue of lumber. A number of 
discussions have been held between the two nations on the lumber 
issue but no agreement has been be reached. Because of this, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce moved to impose a 15 percent ta r if f  on 
Canadian softwood lumber imports. The decision w ill not become final 
until December 30, 1986 and Canada w ill not decide what actions to 
take in response to the ta r if f  until then. It is certain, however, that 
the U.S. ta r if f  w ill not be the end to the lumber dispute. Since both 
sides have stated that free trade talks cannot begin until the lumber 
issue is resolved, i t  seems unlikely that a free trade accord could 
be reached by the fa ll '86 deadline. The present trade talks between 
Canada and the United States are bound for failure. The only hope for 
a free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. Is i f  settlement 
can be reached on the lumber issue and then the U.S. Congress and 
Canadian government agree to begin a new round of trade talks.
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